(environmental conditionality). So, after setting out the moral framework we use to evaluate the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps, we will discuss some moral problems that have been attributed to economic conditionality. We will then show how similar problems may apply to debt-for-climate swaps both in theory and in practice. Finally, we will entertain some objections to our argument.
Inquiry into the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps is important in the context of debates about how we should mitigate climate change. Consider that, as a result of its Tropical Forest Conservation Act, the U.S. signed twelve debt-for-nature agreements with countries including Panama, Bangladesh, Botswana, Belize, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and the Philippines.
xvi By 2006, the U.S. had already saved a million acres of forest with such swaps. xvii If we use what seems to be a conservative estimate of .5 metric tons of carbon saved per acre, then these swaps have saved around 500,000 metric tons of carbon from entering the atmosphere per year. (For a frame of reference, global emissions are about 7 billion tons per year.) xviii Furthermore, as some developing countries have proposed that they be allowed to sell their carbon credits in exchange for debt relief, it seems that debt-for-climate swaps hold great potential for dealing with global climate change, whether used in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional carbon trading programs. xix Although many discuss the permissibility of different carbon-trading regimes, we know of few papers examining the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTREME POVERTY
This paper will work within a human rights framework, which assumes that we all possess human rights in virtue of our humanity and that we all have an equal claim to their fulfillment. xx Human rights have traditionally been understood as the rights necessary to secure individuals' basic interests and/or autonomy. xxi To stay neutral between these competing accounts of human rights, however, this paper will simply say that people have a human right to the things they need to secure a minimally decent life (so that whatever interests or autonomy individuals must be able to secure are included here). xxii We have human rights to those things that are necessary for living a minimally decent life and against those things that are detrimental to living a minimally decent life.
xxiii On this framework, we have a human right against extreme poverty-or, alternatively, a
human right to what we need in order to avoid extreme poverty. For extreme poverty poses a common threat to individuals' ability to live minimally decent lives. It is worth noting how uncontroversial this assumption is. Whatever a minimally decent life requires, surely it requires at least those things essential for sustaining life itself, and these are ex hypothesi the very things put at risk by extreme poverty.
Now supposing that everyone has a human right against extreme poverty, it is incumbent on us (i.e., humanity) to ameliorate it. But just what does it mean to lay responsibility for securing the human rights of everyone at the doorstep of humanity? What does it mean to say the duties that arise from human rights are duties of humanity? Here, we might follow James Nickel who provides a clear and plausible answer:
(1) governments are the primary addressees of the human rights of their residents, with duties both to respect and to uphold their human rights; (2) governments have negative duties to respect the rights of people from other countries; (3) individuals have negative responsibilities to respect the human rights of people at home and abroad; (4) individuals have responsibilities as voters and citizens to promote human rights in their own country;
and (5) • Liberalize trade (say) by reducing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.
• Liberalize financial markets (say) by allowing world markets to dictate exchange rates or devalue local currencies against hard currencies such as the dollar.
• Diminish the role of the state in guiding the economy (say) by privatizing major sectors of the economy, decreasing government bureaucracy, and reducing spending on such things as healthcare, education, and welfare. appears that Bolivia was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If so, the requirement on Bolivia to privatize its water supply was unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.
In another case, the International Monetary Fund required Ecuador to privatize its water and sewage system as a condition of giving Ecuador a loan. Although service improved in some respects, poor infrastructure led to an outbreak of hepatitis A, and poor Ecuadorians suffered as prices rose and subsidies were eliminated. As a result, some suggest that, in some parts of Ecuador, the poor were unable gain access to clean water and sanitation: 76% of the residents of Plan Piloto, for instance, characterized their water as 'turbulent and foul smelling'; 45% said it was 'yellow or dark'; and 74% said it smelled like feces.
xxxv It thus appears that Ecuador was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If so, the requirement on Ecuador to privatize its water and sewage system was unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.
Finally, in a third case, the International Monetary Fund pressured Niger to put a 19 percent value-added tax on goods -including foodstuffs -as a condition of giving Niger a loan.
The tax was levied even though food costs had risen more than 75 percent in the previous five years, and even though Niger's nomadic herders' main source of income (livestock) had fallen 25 percent in value. xxxvi Although causation is notoriously hard to prove, there was famine in Niger that year, and the tax may well have been an aggravating factor. xxxvii It thus appears that Niger was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If so, the requirement on Niger to impose a 19 percent value-added tax on goods -including foodstuffs -was unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.
IV. DEBT-FOR-CLIMATE SWAPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONALITY
Now we turn to the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps. International loans with traditional conditions attached are structurally similar to debt-for-climate swaps. Just as international loans require debtor countries to institute certain economic programs, debt-forclimate swaps require debtor countries to institute certain environmental programs. Both institutions exhibit the following structure: Creditor C will do X for debtor country D if and only if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places a sustainability condition on all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute program P while securing the human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme poverty), then the transaction in question -whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate swap -is morally questionable, if not impermissible. We know from our discussion in §III that at least some international loans with traditional conditions attached are morally questionable for this reason, and, given the structural similarity between such loans and debt-for-climate swaps, we have reason to subject debt-for-climate swaps to a similar level of moral scrutiny.
Although debt-for-climate swaps are supposed to reduce a debtor country's international debt burden, this may not be enough for those offering such swaps to have discharged their moral duties to the people in that country. Whether those offering (or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps have discharged these duties depends on whether the swaps are sustainable-a matter for empirical inquiry. Such inquiry must examine whether a debtor country can fulfill the conditions on a debt-for-climate swap while maintaining the necessary economic growth, domestic infrastructure, and/or redistributive mechanisms sufficient for securing the human rights of its people. Suppose, for instance, that the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) brokers a debt-for-climate swap between the U.S. and Indonesia, in which the U.S. agrees to forgive US$100 million of Indonesian debt so long as Indonesia agrees to institute a US$20 million conservation program designed to protect its tropical rainforest. The permissibility of such a swap will depend on inter alia its sustainability: the US$20 million conservation program must not prevent Indonesia from maintaining the economic growth, infrastructure, and redistributive mechanisms necessary to protect current and future generations of Indonesians from extreme poverty.
One might object that a debt-for-climate swap is permissible as long as it benefits a debtor country and its people. Rather than sustainability, one might say, perhaps the appropriate moral standard is that a swap just leave a country better able to secure the rights of its people.
Indeed, one might insist that swaps are only problematic if they make a country less able to secure the rights of its people.
xxxviii While this may be so on some moral framework, it is not so on the human rights framework set out in §II. This is because a swap can lighten a country's debt burden, increase its ability to fulfill the rights of its people, and still prevent the country from completely fulfilling these rights. Suppose, for instance, the U.S. offers to reduce Indonesia's debt obligations if it agrees to create a nature reserve in a debt-for-climate swap. Even if the swap improves Indonesia's political power and the average welfare of Indonesians, for instance, creating the reserve could still make it more difficult (if not impossible) for Indonesia to help the very poor meet their basic needs. So, the permissibility of a debt-for-climate swap depends not simply on whether the debtor country and its people benefit from the swap. It also matters whether the country can protect its people from extreme poverty while fulfilling the environmental conditions placed on the swap.
Nonetheless, there may be cases in which a particular debt-for-nature swap is the best a creditor (or broker) can do to help a debtor country protect its people from extreme poverty.
Perhaps the level of poverty, or the level of environmental degradation, is just that severe. Such cases present terrible choices, where creditors (or brokers) must choose between making an otherwise impermissible offer and doing what (say) has better consequences for the poor or the environment. If an unsustainable debt-for-nature swap happens to be the morally best option available to a creditor (or broker), then offering (or brokering) the swap may be the right thing to do in the circumstances. But this is a terrible choice even if it's easy to make and no one is blameworthy for having to make it.
By classifying the right choice as terrible, one expresses an abiding interest in avoiding circumstances where we are forced to make ourselves complicit -however blamelessly -in the perpetuation of extreme poverty and, other things being equal, the violation of human rights.
xxxix
The importance of this point cannot be overstated, since it is precisely by doing this that we can guard against failures of imagination which result in the unnecessary perpetuation of extreme poverty and human rights violations. Because the permissibility of offering (or brokering) an unsustainable debt-for-climate swap depends on the absence of better options, we must be sure to exhaust our imaginations before concluding that our best option is an unsustainable debt-forclimate swap. If we fail to exhaust our imaginations in the effort to find feasible alternatives to unsustainable debt-for-climate swaps, then we make ourselves not only complicit but culpable in the perpetuation of extreme poverty and violation of human rights. xl Indeed, this is the more general thrust of our argument: we must ensure that debt-for-climate swaps, which seem wonderful on the surface, do not provide creditors and brokers with an all-too-easy excuse for their conduct in a world that allows for the perpetuation of extreme poverty.
So far this paper has argued that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable when they are unsustainable, but there are likely other salient conditions on their permissibility-in addition to sustainability. We have thus far assumed that the debt being swapped for nature in debt-for-climate swaps comes from valid loans. But this need not be the case. The original loan could be odious. Odious loans are either (1) accepted by those without legitimate authority or (2) used for purposes that do not benefit the debtor country or its inhabitants. xli If, for instance, a dictator accepts a loan and embezzles the money, then that country's citizens should not be held to account. Other things being equal, these loans are invalid. So it seems that the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps will be contingent on the validity of the original loans underlying the swaps. If those involved in offering (or brokering) a debt-for-climate swap know (or should have known) that the original loan is invalid -say, because it's odious or unsustainable -, then it may well be impermissible to offer (or broker) the swap.
More generally, creditors and brokers in debt-for-climate swaps must be acting in good faith. A colloquial example is helpful here. If one buys a Bose speaker system from Target, then one gains valid title to the speakers even if they turn out to have been stolen, since it is rarely (if ever) the case that goods sold at Target are stolen. If, however, one buys a Bose speaker system from a pawn shop, then the title may be invalid, since it is commonly the case that goods sold at pawn shops are stolen. As Leif Wenar explains:
In order for a purchaser to act in good faith, it must be reasonable for him to believe that he is dealing with a genuine vendor-one with neither void nor voidable title. It must be reasonable, that is, for the purchaser to believe either that the vendor is the owner of the good or that the owner has authorized the vendor while free from deception, duress, or undue influence. There may also be other conditions on the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps, though this paper will not focus upon them. Loans may, for instance, be impermissible because they are exploitative. xliii Exploitative loans are offered by creditors who use their disproportionate bargaining power to coerce debtors into accepting conditions that would not otherwise be reasonable to accept. A debt-for-climate swap could be impermissible because it is based on an exploitative loan, or because the swap itself is exploitative. For the sake of brevity, however, what follows will focus only on the sustainability and good-faith conditions for permissibility.
Let us now turn to debt-for-climate (and, more generally, debt-for-nature) swaps in practice. Do real cases of debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps always (or generally) satisfy the conditions on permissibility set forth in §IV? Assuming the goodwill of all participating parties, this section will suggest that many may not. Debtor countries in debt-for-climate swaps (almost) invariably face unsustainable debt burdens. For this reason, it seems that those who offer (or broker) debt-for-climate swaps may be acting in bad faith-especially, since there is often little reason to think that the swaps will be sustainable.
Many poor countries are highly indebted with debt-to-export ratios of over 200 servicing massive debts will be able to protect their citizens' human rights from one generation to the next. If they are not able to do so, then, as discussed in §III above, the international loans that originally created the unsustainable debts are morally questionable, if not impermissible, and so, by extension, are any debt-for-climate swaps that serve to perpetuate such unsustainable debts in the form of environmental conditionality.
One might object that the evidence does not show that swaps are undermining human rights in any respect. Without the swaps poor countries and their people would be worse off. The swaps, instead, improve countries' ability to fulfill their subjects' human rights.
If one agrees, however, that traditional economic conditionality undermines human rights, one should agree that debt-for-climate swaps do so. For, the structure of debt-for-climate swaps is the same as the structure of traditional economic conditionality: Creditor C will do X for debtor country D if and only if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places a sustainability condition on all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute program P while securing the human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme poverty), then the transaction in question -whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate swap -is morally questionable, if not impermissible. It does not matter if, without P, some other requirement R (e.g., the original conditions on a loan) were in place that would also undermine a country's ability to fulfill even the same people's human rights. The basic principle does not include an exception for cases where more people's rights are fulfilled or fewer undermined with P in place.
In light of these reflections, there is reason to worry that some debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps are impermissible. Some highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) --including Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua --have already received debt-for-climate (or other debt-fornature) swaps. xlix At least, one should be just as inclined to question the permissibility of debt-forclimate swaps as one is to question the permissibility of the international loans on which they are based.
Furthermore, many of the debts developing countries bear were taken on by corrupt and treacherous rulers who did not use the loans to benefit their country or their people. Nor did the countries or institutions making these loans have good reason to think that these rulers would use the loans to aid the extremely poor. Ostensibly, then, there are many odious debts. For instance, much of the Philippines' debt acquired under Marcos, or Indonesia's debt acquired under Suharto, is odious.
l And yet, creditors have offered both the Philippines and Indonesia debt-forclimate (and nature) swaps. li While more evidence is needed to establish that the creditors (or brokers) in these swaps were acting in bad faith, it seems that suspicion is warranted.
As noted above, there may be cases in which the best option available to those offering (or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps is to offer (or broker) an unsustainable or bad faith swap. If that is the best they can do, then it may be better than doing nothing. But, again, this is a terrible choice, even if no one is blameworthy for having to make it.
V. OBJECTIONS

Are debt-for-climate swaps uniquely wrong?
One might object that the paper has done nothing to show that anything is distinctively wrong (or questionable) about debt-for-climate swaps. After all, what are debt-for-climate swaps, but creative attempts by well-meaning people to address the problem of environmental degradation while simultaneously lessening the massive debt burdens of developing countries?
Surely there is nothing wrong with this, and just as surely, one might argue, the paper has done nothing to locate the potential wrongness of debt-for-climate swaps in its analysis of the swaps themselves.
While this objection is correct in claiming that the paper does not account for the 
Are we asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps?
One might still object that we are asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps when we make their permissibility contingent on how they impact the poor. Extreme poverty exists for a variety of reasons that have little or nothing to do with debt-for-climate swaps themselves, including the economic actions and policies of corporations, affluent countries, international financial institutions, and vicious dictators. In this context, one might argue, it is a mistake to conclude that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable, if not impermissible, simply because they fail to make a non-ideal world ideal.
Again, we believe this objection misses the thrust of the paper's argument. Our point is that the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends on how they impact individuals' basic human rights. We do not conclude, as the objection suggests, that the permissibility of debt-forclimate swaps depends on whether they provide a panacea to extreme poverty, much less all the world's ills. That said, we do suppose that the circumstances in which one offers (or brokers) a debt-for-climate swap are relevant to its permissibility, since how a debt-for-climate swap affects people's ability to secure the objects of their human rights will depend on background facts over which those who offer or broker the swap have no control. It makes sense to judge the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps -or anything else for that matter -in accordance with their real-world effects, not in accordance with the effects they would have had were the world a much different place. Presumably, we are responsible for the actual (if foreseeable) consequences of our actions, not the counter-factual consequences of our actions. For instance, we cannot excuse ourselves for pushing somebody off the edge of a cliff simply by pointing out that (a) we were not responsible for him standing at the edge of a cliff, and that (b) our push would not have sent him over the cliff were he standing in the middle of a cornfield. Similarly, creditors and brokers of debt-for-climate swaps cannot excuse themselves from pushing people into extreme poverty simply by pointing out that (a) they were not responsible for such people being on the edge of extreme poverty, and that (b) the debt-for-climate swap would not have pushed people into extreme poverty were the economic actions and policies of affluent countries, corporations, international financial institutions, or vicious dictators different. A similar argument applies in cases where, given existing background conditions, debt-for-climate swaps merely prevent people from escaping extreme poverty.
Furthermore, the fact that the world might have to change in certain ways in order for certain debt-for-climate swaps to be permissible does not undermine the paper's argument.
Rather, it expands the significance and import of the paper, since there likely are ways of changing national and international policies, rules, and institutions so that they protect human rights better than the status quo. Thomas Pogge has argued, for instance, that we should collect a global tax on the use of natural resources and use the dividends to ameliorate extreme poverty.
liii And one of us has argued elsewhere that there are ways of changing the rules of trade and aid that could greatly help the poor. liv No matter the efficacy of any specific proposal, however, the paper's general conclusion still stands: the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends (in part) on whether the international community exercises its collective imagination in the effort to eliminate extreme poverty.
Again, this is not to deny that there may well be cases in which an unsustainable or bad faith debt-for-climate swap is the best option available. But, as argued in §IV, we should make every effort to avoid having to make such terrible choices-even if circumstances ultimately dictate that no one is blameworthy for having to make them.
What about the value of nature?
One might object that protecting nature is just as important as, if not more important than, securing human rights. So, the objector might suggest, a moral framework based solely on human rights, which lacks an environmental ethic, is inadequate to morally evaluate debt-for-climate swaps. Some might argue, for instance, that there is an obligation to give equal consideration to animal interests, lv to treat all teleological subjects of a life as members of our moral community, lvi or to protect species, ecosystems, and the biosphere for their own sake. lvii These people might claim that, even if debt-for-climate swaps undermine the ability of people to avoid extreme poverty, they are permissible so long as they succeed in protecting the environment. Indeed, if a debt-for-climate swap will help mitigate the effects of climate change, or save some species from extinction, then such a swap may well be obligatory. After all, many environmentalists have argued for similar conclusions. ii The moral conclusions we can draw from these facts are less clear. See, for instance: Author, Forthcoming a.
iii See, for example, IPCC 2007 IPCC , 2007 Gardiner, 2004; Mayell, 2002. iv'Some 831 million human beings are undernourished, 1197 million lack access to safe water and 2747 million lack access to standard sanitation… About 2000 million lack access to essential drugs… Some 1000 million have xx See, for example, Nickel, 2007; Pogge, 2002; Buchanan, 2007 . xxi Nickel 1993 Pogge, 2002; Buchanan, 2007 : Gewirth, 1996 xxii For preliminary defense of this conception of rights see Author, Forthcoming c.
xxiii At least, that is, people have a right against standard threats to their ability to live a minimally good life, and to have standard protections of this ability.
xxiv Nickel, 2005, p. 396 . For an expanded discussion of this, see Nickel 1993 and xxv See Pogge, 2002; Buchanan, 2007. xxvi See Pogge, 2002; Buchanan, 2007. xxvii People and non-state institutions also have secondary obligations to assist in protecting human rights. As citizens, for instance, we have obligations to vote or campaign for appropriate protections. xxxi See, for example, Bello, 1996; Sachs, 2005. xxxii Looking at the guidebook for countries it seems privatization, liberalization and freer trade are encouraged:
(The World Bank, 2010). Attending to the content of the particular programs implemented in developing countries after the supposed end of structural adjustment also allows us to see how similar the new requirements are to the old requirements (IMF, 2003) .
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xxxix Indeed, we may even be able to rationally regret having to make a terrible choice that prevents us from realizing something we value such as the protection of human rights. We do not suggest that the above cases present tragic dilemmas only because we do not want to enter into the debate about whether truly tragic dilemmas are possible here. See Stocker 1990 , however, for more on rational regret in terrible circumstances.
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